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Abstract:	   The	   paper	   contrasts	   two	   theoretical	   perspectives	   that	   account	   for	   business	  
group	   formation	   in	   the	   small	   business	   sector:	   the	   financial	   perspective	   and	   the	  
organizational/entrepreneurial	   perspective.	   Two	   main	   hypotheses	   are	   derived	   from	  
these	   perspectives:	   the	   first	   hypothesis	   concerns	   capital	   and	   knowledge	   intensity	  
required	   by	   the	   business;	   the	   second	   one	   refers	   to	   the	   entrepreneur’s	   ownership	   of	  
firms	   in	   business	   groups.	   The	   empirical	   results	   show	   that	   the	   financial	   and	   the	  
organizational	  perspectives	  are	  both	  relevant	  in	  explaining	  business	  groups	  in	  the	  small	  
business	   sector,	   but	   the	   entrepreneurial	   perspective	   is	   more	   appropriate	   when	  
explaining	  the	  ownership	  structure	  of	  firms	  within	  business	  groups.	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1 Introduction
A business group is a set of firms owned and controlled by the same
people by means of ownership ties . Interest in studying business groups
has grown, as a result of an increased awareness of their widespread pres-
ence and economic importance in both emerging and developed countries.
In the small business sector business groups are associated with ‘portfolio
entrepreneurs’ i.e. habitual entrepreneurs who retain ownership and con-
trol of previously established businesses thus leading to the formation of
business groups.
Most of the literature on business groups has referred to large corporate
groups, sometimes the largest in a country, but there is increasing awareness
that portfolio entrepreneurs and business groups are widespread in all sec-
tors and size classes and are relevant also in the small business sector. The
presence of business groups in the small business sector suggests that their
development may be associated with entrepreneurial processes, and partic-
ularly with the activities and strategic behaviours of habitual entrepreneurs
(Rosa, 1998; Iacobucci and Rosa, 2005 and 2010).
In the present study we define business groups in terms of ownership
and control ties. We would not deny the importance of other forms of rela-
tions among firms that are not based on ownership ties , but we adopt that
definition here both because it gives clearer and more objective guidance to
delimit the boundaries of the group and it is suited to the aims of this study.1
There is a large literature explaining the presence of business groups. Most
of this literature refers to emerging countries and considers the group to be
a substitute for the deficiency of market institutions and imperfect informa-
tion flows, the so-called institutional voids theory.2 In the case of advanced
economies, where such deficiencies are less marked, groups have been seen
mainly as financial devices to separate control and cash-flow rights. The
main aim of this paper is to compare the financial explanation with an alter-
native explanation based on entrepreneurial/organizational reasons. The
financial and entrepreneurial perspectives analysed in this paper are not
conflicting with the institutional voids theory put forward to explain the
presence of business groups in emerging economies. We focus on the first
two explanations as our empirical analysis refers to business groups in an
advanced economy.
Moreover, we focus on small and medium sized groups which are less
1 This is the same definition normally adopted in the economics and business literature
(Lhuillery, 2011). The definition of business group used in this paper is also the one
normally adopted by statistical agencies (Eurostat 2003) and by the financial accounting
standards for delimiting the area of consolidation when drawing consolidated financial
statements.
2 It is beyond the scope of this paper to review this literature: see Colpan et al. (2010) for
an up-to-date survey.
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researched. The small business and portfolio entrepreneurship3 literature
has concentrated on the entrepreneur, who is assumed to be the main agent
for establishing the business group. Research has found that establishing
or expanding a business group is a common way for entrepreneurs to de-
velop a new business. Up to a third of smaller limited companies may be
part of multiple venture creation activities by their founder entrepreneurs
These entrepreneurs demonstrate a preference for establishing additional
new ventures, rather than focusing on growing a single business into a large
one. Several studies have explored the differences between novice, habitual
and portfolio entrepreneurs and how these differences may influence new
business performance.
One of the key research questions is why and when portfolio entreprene-
urs decide to set up a new firm to develop a new business rather than ex-
ploiting the new opportunity within the already established company. On a
theoretical basis there are two main competing views on this issue.
First, the financial explanation put forward by several authors stresses
the importance of raising outside equity to explain the creation of a new
firm when exploiting a new business opportunity. Second, the entrepreneu-
rial/organizational explanation which emphasizes the fact that legal auton-
omy allows entrepreneurs to involve other people in the ownership of the
new business. By involving other people in the start-up of new ventures,
entrepreneurs enhance their ability to exploit new business opportunities
by mobilizing and motivating specialized human capital resources.
Both explanations offer useful insights for understanding the presence of
portfolio entrepreneurs in the small firm sector, but they differ in their basic
assumptions and consequent results. This paper aims at comparing, on an
empirical basis, the predictions of these two perspectives. It takes advan-
tage of an Italian survey of manufacturing firms that contains information
on business groups. To our best knowledge this paper is the first attempt at
empirically testing and comparing the predictions of the financial and the
entrepreneurial perspectives on business groups in the small business sec-
tor,4 and the first to consider how far the two perspectives link with each
other.
The paper makes the following contributions. We show that the finan-
cial and the organizational perspectives can be considered to some extent
complementary in explaining the presence of business groups. Specifically,
the financial explanation is in accordance with the data in predicting the
presence of larger and capital intensive firms in business groups while the
organizational explanation is in accordance with empirical evidence in pre-
3 We follow the definitions of Birley and Westhead (1994), where an habitual entrepreneur
is one that starts more than one business. A portfolio entrepreneur starts and retains
ownership and control of several businesses. In contrast a serial entrepreneur only owns
one business at a time, always closing a business before starting another one.
4 Also Almeida et al. (2011) test some hypothesis derived from the financial perspective;
however, they refer to large listed groups in Korea.
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dicting the presence of knowledge intensive firms in business groups. Fi-
nally, the organizational perspective is more appropriate when explaining
the ownership structure of controlled companies.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the theoretical
literature on business groups, discuss in more detail the theoretical predic-
tions of the financial and organizational approaches, and present the hy-
potheses to be tested. Section 3 discusses the methodology and describes
the dataset used in the empirical part. Section 4 presents and discusses the
results while Section 5 draws conclusions and suggests future research pos-
sibilities.
2 Theoretical issues and research questions
Business groups are the results of established entrepreneurs setting up
or acquiring new companies. The empirical evidence shows that setting up
a new firm is a common approach of established entrepreneurs when pur-
suing new business opportunities.5 We lack detailed data on the prevalence
of business groups in different countries; but business groups are relevant in
all the industrialized countries and also in the small business sector. More-
over, the frequency of business groups appears to be increasing
According to the latest information provided by ISTAT (the Italian Na-
tional Statistics Agency) in Italy there were in 2010 more than 80 thousands
business groups, controlling about 180,000 companies and with 5.7 million
employees They represent more than a third of the overall employees in the
private sector and more than a half of the employees of joint stock com-
panies. Moreover, the number of companies and employees of business
groups is underestimated as they refer only to the companies located in
Italy.
Table 1 - Business Groups in Italy - 2010
 
Class of  
employees 
of groups 
Groups 
Employees  
(thousands) 
Firms* Average 
firms per 
group 
Average 
employees 
per firm 
Average 
employees 
per group Number % Number % Number % 
1-19 54,624 66.4 359 6.3 100,216 54.1 1.8 3.6 6.5 
20-99 20,566 25.0 882 15.5 51,715 27.9 2.5 17.1 42.9 
100-499 5,676 6.9 1,156 20.3 21,390 11.6 3.8 54.0 203.0 
500-4999 1,316 1.6 1,594 28.0 10,129 5.5 7.7 161.6 1,240.5 
5000 e oltre 82 0.1 1,702 29.9 1,700 0.9 20.6 731.5 15,082.8 
TOTAL 82,265 100 5,693 100 185,149 100.0 2.3 30.7 69.2 
 * The number of firms per group is underestimated as they refer only to firms located in Italy
Source: ISTAT
Most of groups have less than 500 employees; they control almost 95% of
5 For an established entrepreneur the alternative way would be to develop the new busi-
ness within his/her established firm.
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the companies and about 40% of the overall employees. As observed also in
other developed countries, the phenomenon of business groups is relevant
also among small and medium sized firms.6
To explain when and why a growth strategy results in the formation
of a business group, we need to examine the specific advantages of giving
legal autonomy to organizational units created to develop a new business.
One of the main advantages is that setting up a new legal entity allows
entrepreneurs to differentiate the ownership structure of the new activity
from the established one(s), thus allowing equity capital to be raised from
minority shareholders.
There are two main theoretical approaches to explain why entrepreneurs
prefer to differentiate ownership in this way. The first (we term the financial
perspective) stresses the raising of outside equity to maximize the return on
the capital invested by the entrepreneur, made possible by having a separate
legal unit . The second (we term the organisational perspective) considers
the involvement of other people in the ownership of the new business in
order to enlarge the entrepreneurial team; this is done by recruiting and
engaging expertise without diluting ownership of the main business(es).
These two explanations have different implications for the ownership struc-
ture of the new business and the role played by the providers of outside
equity.
Within the financial perspective business groups are considered as a
mechanism for separating cash-flow rights from control rights which al-
lows, for example, family business owners to control and grow large com-
panies with little investment.7 This approach has been traditionally applied
to large, publicly traded, firms. It is unclear to what extent this explana-
tion is valid in the case of smaller firms. Referring to family firms Almeida
and Wolfenzon (2006) recently suggested the importance of raising outside
equity to justify the creation of a new legal unit when exploiting a new busi-
ness.
According to the financial perspective (henceforth FP) business groups
are used by entrepreneurs to manipulate the ownership structure of new
businesses to maximize their financial wealth. The legal autonomy of the
new business gives the entrepreneur the opportunity to raise outside eq-
uity to finance new ventures. In the FP it is taken for granted that the ‘en-
trepreneur’ retains control and management of the new business and that
the minority shareholders are purely investors with no involvement in man-
agement. This model justifies the presence of business groups because en-
trepreneurs have advantages in being able to draw on the cash flow of their
existing businesses to leverage further capital from outsiders who are in-
6 In Appendix A we provide some examples of Italian business groups.
7 This approach has a long history which can be traced back to the seminal works by Berle
and Means (1932) and Hilferding and Bottomore (1981). For a discussion see Almeida
and Wolfenzon (2006, p. 2638).
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vesting in the new venture Within the financial explanation there is a debate
on whether the internal capital market in business groups is used as a way
of expropriating minority shareholders or to support controlled companies
in periods of financial distress In general, the literature assumes that the
tunnelling of resources among firms within groups advantages controlling
shareholders.
The organizational perspective (henceforth OP) focuses on the organiza-
tional problems faced by entrepreneurs when developing new businesses.
When considering entry into a new business, established entrepreneurs are
faced with two problems: a) how to take advantage of the synergies with es-
tablished businesses while guaranteeing the necessary autonomy of the new
business; b) how to divide time and attention between the management of
established businesses and the new venture.
The start-up phase is critical to the success of the new business and re-
quires that the entrepreneur dedicates her/his time and attention to adjust
planned actions to unforeseen events, and to deal with unpredictable con-
tingencies typical of this initial phase. Yet as a habitual entrepreneur he or
she still needs to devote time to running the other company(s). Establish-
ing a new company rather than growing within the same one confers real
advantages to the entrepreneur in addressing these problems. The legal au-
tonomy granted to the new venture helps to focus resources and monitor
results. In addition, and even more importantly, legal autonomy allows the
entrepreneur to modify the ownership structure of the new business and
give minority shareholdings to those involved in the start-up of the new
venture, without diluting ownership of the main businesses. By involv-
ing other people in the start-up of new ventures, entrepreneurs overcome
the problem of allocating their time between their established and new ac-
tivities, and enhance their ability to enter new businesses while retaining
ownership and control of already established firms.
In addition to the time allocation problem, the involvement of other peo-
ple in the ownership and control of new businesses enables the entrepreneur
to introduce and involve specialized human capital resources. Moreover,
when starting a new business entrepreneurs need to provide incentives to
key employees to protect from the risk of being expropriated of the sources
of competitive advantages. One of the ways to prevent knowledge steal
from key people is to involve them in the ownership thus entrenching them
to the new business. In addition, the ownership of a minority share in the
new business, allows the employee to become part of the entrepreneurial
team thus providing further motivation. The latter arguments are more and
more important because the sources of competitive advantage are shifting
from physical assets to knowledge/intangible assets that can be more easily
stolen by key employees.
The two perspectives (FP and OP) reach similar conclusions about the
main reasons for setting up a new company, i.e. modifying the ownership
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 6
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structure of the new business, but for different reasons. The empirical rel-
evance of these approaches can be assessed by highlighting their different
predictions; specifically these relate to: i) when it is more likely for a firm
to be part of a business group; ii) the ownership structure of the controlled
firms.
According to the FP, ”firms in pyramids are expected to be larger or to
belong to capital intensive sectors”.8 As the required investment increases,
firms are more likely to belong to business groups. For this reason a key
variable to explain the presence of business groups is expected to be the
amount of capital needed to set up a firm. In contrast, the organizational
perspective emphasizes the importance of human capital in the creation of
new firms. As a result, knowledge intensive firms are more likely to belong
to business groups because of the need to involve in the entrepreneurial
team specialized human resources.
As a result we compare the following contrasting hypotheses:
i.a) larger and more capital intensive firms are more likely to belong to business
groups (FP)
i.b) knowledge intensive firms are more likely to belong to business groups (OP).
A key issue in both explanations of business groups is the ownership
structure of companies. According to the FP the main reason to set up a
business group is to separate cash flow rights and control rights of con-
trolled companies (equity leverage mechanism).9 For this reason we expect
that the ownership stake held by the entrepreneur in directly controlled
company (head of the group) should be at least no smaller than the own-
ership stake held in companies controlled by other companies. We expect,
therefore, that the ownership stake held by entrepreneurs in head compa-
nies is similar to the one held in standalone firms. Moreover, we expect the
entrepreneurs to retain the minimum share to maintain the control of the
business and the minority shares to be as higher as possible.
Within business group it is necessary to distinguish between firms di-
rectly owned by the entrepreneur and firms controlled by other firms, since
it is only in the latter that the ‘equity leverage’ mechanism is at work. Just
to give an intuition, let’s consider Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3.
8 Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) use the term pyramid to refer to firms controlled by other
firms.
9 In contrast to the traditional ‘equity leverage’ argument Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006)
states that: “It is possible to observe pyramids in which the controlling family has high
cash flow stakes in member firms, in which case the separation between ownership
and control is not large” (Almeida and Wolfenzon 2006, p. 2662). Moreover, since the
Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) model does not rely on the traditional argument of sep-
arating cash-flow from control rights, it accounts for situations characterized by high
concentration of ownership in the controlled firms.
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Figure 1 - Example of a Vertical Business Group
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entrepreneur 
Firm B Firm DFirm C
Firm E
Firm A
Figure 2 - Example of a Horizontal Business Group
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entrepreneur 
Firm F Firm HFirm G
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Figure 3 - Example of a ”Mixed” Business Group
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entrepreneur 
Firm I Firm KFirm J
Firm L
Figure 1 is an example of a so-called vertical business group (pyramid).
In this kind of group there is a firm (A) which is at the head of the group.
The head is the only firm which is directly controlled by the entrepreneur
and which controls other firms, directly (e.g. firm B and C) or indirectly (e.g.
firm D). In vertical groups the equity leverage mechanism is at work for all
the affiliated firms but for the head (being directly controlled by the vertex).
Figure 2 is an example of a so-called horizontal group. In a horizontal
group there is not a head: the ‘head’ is, with a little abuse of terminology, the
entrepreneur himself since all firms are directly owned by the entrepreneur.
For this reason in a horizontal group the equity leverage mechanism is not at
work. Finally, Figure 3 presents a ‘mixed’ situation where the equity lever-
age mechanism is at work only for one firm (L) which is owned by another
firm (I).
In the empirical analysis, in order to assess the predictions of FP we will
check whether a firm in a business group is controlled directly by the en-
trepreneur or whether it is controlled by another firm.
In the OP perspective minority stakes in new companies are sold with
the aim of involving other people in the management of new firms; there-
fore, these stakes can be expected to be low since they are aimed primarily
at providing incentives to people involved in the start-up and management
of the new business and not to raise outside equity.
Therefore we can test the following alternative hypotheses:
ii.a) entrepreneur(s) are expected to hold smaller ownership stakes in firms con-
trolled through other firms, relative to firms directly owned and controlled (FP)
ii.b) entrepreneur(s) are expected to hold greater ownership stakes in firms con-
trolled through other firms, relative to firms directly owned and controlled (OP)
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/136 9
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3 Data and Methodology
In this paper we consider whether these theoretical approaches are con-
sistent with empirical evidence of business groups in the small business
sector. The study of these issues has been handicapped by the fact that na-
tional data on habitual entrepreneurs and small business groups are rarely
collected. Most countries collect data on firms, with the assumption that it
is firm performance rather than entrepreneurial performance that is of pri-
mary interest (Scott and Rosa, 1996).
To test the above hypotheses we use quantitative analysis based on sec-
ondary data derived from the Capitalia dataset which is based on a peri-
odical survey (every three years) of a representative sample of about 4,000
Italian manufacturing firms with more than ten employees. In this study
data refer to 2003. The Capitalia survey is particularly suited for our pur-
poses since it requests information indicating whether a firm belongs to a
business group, and what its position is within the group. Moreover, the
dataset allows a detailed analysis of the ownership structure of firms since
it has information on both ownership share and type of owner (person or
legal entity). This information is relevant to our analysis since, as we have
seen, the FP makes some predictions about the level of ownership concen-
tration on the basis of the position of the company within the group and
whether it is controlled directly by the family (head of the group) or through
other companies. The Capitalia dataset does not provide information on the
exact position of the firm within a group. Nevertheless, it asks companies
belonging to a group whether: a) they control other companies but are not
controlled by a company (head of the group); b) they are controlled by a
company and control other companies (intermediate position); c) they are
controlled by a company but do not control other companies (bottom of the
group). The typology of owners and positions within the groups structure
allow us to test the difference between the ownership structure of compa-
nies owned directly by a family, with those owned through established com-
panies. Moreover, the dataset allows us to compare the differences between
independent firms and those belonging to a business group. Although the
study refers to Italy, we have no reason to believe that factors affecting the
presence of business groups are different in Italy.
To test the implications of the two approaches discussed in the previous
section we use Probit and OLS models. The Probit models are used to test
which factors affect the probability of a firm to belong to a business group;
the OLS models are used to analyse the ownership structure of companies
within business groups.
We note that when testing hypothesis i) a reverse causality problem can
occur, that is the affiliation to a business group can affect firms characteris-
tics such as size, R&D intensity, etc. The presence of endogeneity (i.e. one
or more regressors correlated with the error term) will produce biased and
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 10
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inconsistent estimates of coefficients. To cope with endogeneity we use in-
strumental variables. In particular, as instruments we use the mean value
of the variables at the industry level (2-digit Ateco).10 We use these instru-
ments because of the absence of other variables that could be used as proper
instruments. In the next section we discuss in more detail this issue.
Table 2 - Variables Used in the Empirical Analysis
 
 
Variable Description 
Capital 
intensity 
Ratio between fixed assets and the annual sales 
Human 
capital 
Ratio between the number of employees endowed with a degree and 
the total number of employees  
R&D 
intensity 
Ratio between R&D expenses and the annual sales 
Firm size  Logarithm of employees of the firm  
Group size  Logarithm of employees of the group 
Age Age of the firms in years 
Group Dummy variable indicating whether a firms belongs to a group 
Person Dummy variable indicating whether the controlling owner is a person 
(as opposed to a firm) 
Ownership Share of the first (controlling) owner 
Sectors 
dummies 
Dummies for industry sectors based on Pavitt taxonomy1:  
- Supplier dominated (traditional sectors) 
- Scale intensive 
- Specialized supplier 
- Science based 
Controlled Dummy variable indicating whether the firm is controlled by another 
firm  
 (1) To control for industry features we use the Pavitt classification of sectors based on innovation patterns (Pavitt
1984). The classification distinguishes between four macro sectors: scale intensive, dominated suppliers, science
based and specialized suppliers. In the estimates we use the supplier dominated sector as reference.
The Capitalia dataset contains data on 4,280 firms of which 1,386 belong-
ing to business groups. Of the latter, 351 are directly controlled by families
while the remaining are controlled by other companies. There is a large lit-
erature debating what a small firm is, and the complexities of defining a
small firm (quantitatively and qualitatively – see for example). In contrast
there is no literature on what may constitute a small business group. Should
one take the individual firm as the unit of maximum size, or the aggregate
of all the firms in the group? In our view the most important considera-
tion is whether the group is based on the ownership of an entrepreneur (or
family) and not part of a large publically owned corporation. Consequently
we focus on owner managed small firms, and follow the EU definition of
a small firm of comprising no more than 250 employees. When consider-
ing the overall group we restrict our analysis to groups with less than 500
10 We use the Ateco classification which is in accordance with the Nace EU classification.
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employees; given that a group is made up of at least two companies, this
ensures that the average size of companies belonging to groups is less than
250 employees. Thus firms with less than 250 employees are 3,079 of which
791 belonging to a group.
The original dataset has been integrated with data from company annual
reports of 2001, 2002, and 2003. Additional data on variables such as capital
and knowledge intensity, needed to be obtained from the company annual
reports. These were not available for all firms and all years, the dataset we
use is thus made up of about 2,700 firms. It is possible that firms with no
annual reports are the smallest, and this raises the possibility of bias. On
checking, there appeared to be no noticeable difference between the sizes
of firms which had and did not have annual reports. Table 2 shows the
variables used in the empirical analysis, the ways in which they are calcu-
lated and whether they refer to firm or group level. Table 3 presents some
descriptive statistics.
Table 3 - Summary Statistics - Firms with Less than 250 Employees - 2003
 
 
  Firms belonging to groups  
Stand alone firms  
(No Group) 
 
Total 
Controlled  
(firms controlled by 
other firms) 
 
Number of 
observations 
 
791 609 
 
2,288 
  
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
 
Mean 
Standard 
deviation 
Capital 
intensity 
 
.3468 .6479 3189 .3272 
 
.2886 .3138 
Human capital  .072 .087 .072 .090  .043 .062 
R&D intensity  .013 .091 .009 .038  .006 .051 
Firm size 
(employees) 
 
87.12 60.94 84.85 59.94 
 
49.46 41.80 
Group size 
(employees) 
 
2,317.76 14,250.16 3,015.99 16,547.2 
 
  
Ownership  75.06% 27.75 81.07% 24.96  53.36% 26.32 
Age (years)  25.5 18.7 23.9 18.6  28.1 17.9 
 
 Elaborations on Capitalia data set.
4 Empirical analysis
The first hypothesis we test is that larger or capital intensive firms are
more likely to belong to business groups (FP), and its correspondent “or-
ganizational” counterpart (OP) - i.e. knowledge intensive firms are more
likely to belong to business groups.
In order to test these hypotheses we use fixed assets (in logarithmic
Copyright c© 2015 University of Perugia Electronic Press. All rights reserved 12
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terms) as a proxy of capital investment of the firm. Moreover, we use the
share of employees with a degree on total employees as a proxy for the im-
portance of human capital and the ratio between R&D expenses and sales
to measure the knowledge intensive of the firm. We also control for the size
of the firms (employees in logarithmic terms) and the age of the firm.
Before introducing Probit estimations we present the correlations matrix
between the independent variables of the regressions (Table 4).
Table 4 - Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables Used in the Regression for the
Companyaˆs Affiliation to a Business Group (2003)
 
 
 Capital Intensity Human  capital 
R&D 
intensity 
Firm 
Size 
Group 
size 
Age 
Capital 
intensity 
1.000 
  
 
  
Human capital  .0899 1.000     
R&D intensity  .4358 .1106 1.000    
Firm Size  .0557 .1049 .0502 1.000   
Group size -.0267 .0117 -.0125 .4061 1.0000  
Age .0333 -.0103 .0355 .1247 - .0893 1.000 
 
 Elaborations on Capitalia data set.
The probability for a firm to belong to a group (hypothesis 1) is tested us-
ing Probit estimates. The dependent variable (Group) is a dummy variable
which equals 1 if the company belongs to a business group and 0 if the com-
pany is an unaffiliated one. In order to tackle endogeneity problems we will
use instruments for the explanatory variables: Capital intensity, Human capi-
tal, R&D intensity, Firm size. As instruments as said above we use the mean
values at 2-digit industry level. The regressions are carried out by using
the ivprobit-STATA command. In order to check the validity of instruments
(weak instruments) we also run a linear regression model with instrumental
variables. In this case, in order to perform a test of overidentified restrictions
we add another instrument which is: the mean value of log of total Assets
at two-digit ATECO. We perform both Sargan and Bassman tests of overi-
dentified restrictions for the 2SLS estimator. Furthermore we run the model
by requiring robust standard errors and then obtaining Wooldridge’s score
test of overidentified restrictions (which is robust to heteroskedasticity). All
tests do not reject the null hypotheses that the instruments are uncorrelated
with the error term.
We note that the variable Human capital is highly significant in all specifi-
cations, while the variable Capital intensity is less significant and non robust
to various specifications. The strong effect of size in influencing the prob-
ability of being in a group is confirmed by the relevance and significance
of the firm size variable and supports the FP. Overall these results are in
accordance with both the predictions of the financial and the organizational
perspectives (Table 5). In this sense the organizational and the financial ex-
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Table 5 - Probability of a Firm Belonging to a Business Group (Z-Values in Parenthe-
ses)
 
 
 Probita 
 1 2 3 b 4b 
Capital intensity 
.5981* 
(1.84) 
.5375 
(1.38) 
1.2289 
(1.63) 
1.0924* 
(1.69) 
Human Capital 
6.4711*** 
(3.06) 
6.4642*** 
(3.07) 
8.4490*** 
(2.83) 
7.1526** 
(2.31) 
Firm size 
.8639*** 
(2.96) 
.8015** 
(2.17) 
1.3300*** 
(2.91) 
.7877 
(1.28) 
Age 
-.0108*** 
(-4.88) 
-.0106*** 
(-4.46) 
-.01509*** 
(-4.72) 
-.0127***  
(-3.75) 
R&D intensity   
.7987 
(0.28) 
 
6.9603 
(1.00) 
Scale  
.2034** 
(2.39) 
.2054** 
(2.43) 
.2350** 
(2.33) 
.2438** 
(2.57) 
Specialized 
.0598 
(0.58) 
.0627 
(0.61) 
.0083 
 (0.06) 
.0651 
(0.46) 
Science 
-.0363 
(-0.17) 
-.0580 
(0.24) 
-.1301  
(-0.45) 
-.1235** 
(-0.45) 
N° of observation 2,678 2,678 2,337 2,337 
Wald Chi2 
74.54 
(0.000) 
75.32 
(0.000) 
59.61 
(0.000) 
66.23 
(0.000) 
Wald test of exogeneity: Chi2 
9.41 
(0.0243) 
9.38 
(0.0523) 
10.87 
(0.0125) 
10.99 
(0.0267) 
 a. The regression includes a constant term.
b. Firms carrying out operations of acquisition/hiving off in the period considered are excluded.
Legend: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Elaborations on Capitalia data set.
planations seem to be complementary to each other. The variable used as
a proxy for the knowledge intensity of production (R&D intensity) is never
statistically significant.
Table 6 - Share of Ownership of Companies Belonging to Business Groups and T-test
of Mean Differences - 480 Groups with Less than 500 Employees - 2003 (Percentage
Values)
 
 
Owner Standalone Head Intermediate Bottom 
t test a 
Head/Stand. 
Pr (|T|>|t|) 
t test a 
Head/Interm. 
Pr (|T|>|t|) 
t test a 
Head/Bottom 
Pr (|T|>|t|) 
t test a 
Interm./Bottom 
Pr (|T|>|t|) 
First owner 53.4 52.3 71.9 79.2 0.559 0.000** 0.000** 0.032* 
Second owner  24.9 24.0 14.7 13.5 0.394 0.000** 0.000** 0.723 
Third owner 10.7 9.7 6.0 4.0 0.486 0.005** 0.005** 0.137 
 a Legend: two-tailed t-test for mean equality; ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%.
Source: Capitalia data set
The variable Age is significant in all specifications and its coefficient is
negative. This means that affiliated firms are more likely to be younger
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than independent firms.
Finally, we note that according to the Wald test for exogeneity we reject
the null hypotheses that there is no endogeneity.
The Capitalia dataset shows that the share of ownership of controlled
companies is quite high and generally much higher than is needed to secure
control; this is in accordance with the predictions of the OP and contrasts
with FP. This means that separating cash flow from control rights is not al-
ways the justification for creating a group structure (Table 6). We performed
t-tests for mean equalities of ownership shares between standalone firms
and firms belonging to groups. The t-test confirms that there is no signifi-
cant difference in ownership shares between standalone and head of groups
while there are significant differences in ownership shares between the head
of groups and controlled companies (intermediate and bottom companies).
Table 7 - Share of the First Owner in Companies Belonging to Groups (T-test in Paren-
thesis)
 
 
 OLS a 
 1 2 3 4 
Person 
-18.2007*** 
(-5.14) 
-18.1291*** 
(-5.11) 
-18.7448*** 
(-5.27) 
-18.4127*** 
(-5.18) 
Controlled 
17.8677*** 
(4.94) 
18.2751*** 
(5.04) 
16.7964*** 
(4.72) 
18.7676*** 
(5.10) 
Firm size 
2.9789* 
(1.88) 
2.8668* 
(1.80) 
 
4.0553** 
(2.07) 
R&D intensity  
.2966  
(0.07) 
.5993  
(0.33) 
.5137 
 (0.12) 
Group size    
.7449 
(0.40) 
-2.1332  
(-0.95) 
Scale  
-2.9982 
(-0.78) 
-3.2536 
(-0.84) 
-3.1512  
(-0.82) 
Special  
4.2606 
(1.49) 
4.4738 
(1.57) 
4.1415  
(1.45) 
Science  
6.7051 
(1.10) 
5.8813 
(0.98) 
7.0457  
(1.16) 
     
Number of observations 370 370 370 370 
F 52.37 25.73 25.33 22.83 
R2 0.2816 0.2916 0.2853 0.2935 
 
a. Robust standard errors in parentheses; the regression also includes a constant term.
Legend: *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.
Elaborations on Capitalia data set.
The Capitalia dataset also shows that when a company is controlled by
another one, the average share is higher than when it is at the head of the
group and is directly controlled by the entrepreneur. In fact, the main dif-
ference in ownership concentration is observed when we compare firms
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owned directly by the entrepreneur with companies controlled by other
companies; in the latter case, the position within the group is less relevant
to ownership concentration.
In order to analyse prediction ii.a), we assume that ownership concen-
tration is related to variables other than type of owner (physical person or
company) and the position of the company in the group. To assess the ro-
bustness of the previous analysis, we performed a multivariate analysis,
taking into account other variables that potentially might influence owner-
ship concentration.11
The main explanatory variables are Person and Controlled. According
to the FP we expect a positive coefficient for the variable Person since (as
said above) for companies owned directly by the entrepreneur the equity
leverage mechanism is not at work. For symmetrical reasons we expect a
negative coefficient for the variable Controlled.
Moreover we control for company size (measured by the number of em-
ployees), overall size of the group and the technological regime to which the
company belongs. For this last we use ratio of R&D expenditure on sales as
a proxy for the firm’s product innovation intensity. The expectation is that
the coefficient of this variable will be positive because of the greater diffi-
culty involved in raising external capital (equity) for R&D investment (due
to higher information asymmetries). In the case of company size, we ex-
pect a negative coefficient, the reason being that the larger the company, the
greater will be the need for external capital. In the case of the overall size of
the group, we do not have a-priori expectations. On the one hand, a larger
group should be able to generate enough internal cash-flow to finance new
companies on its own; on the other hand, the size of the group can have a
positive influence on the ability to raise external capital. The result of the
multivariate analysis is presented in Table 7.
The multivariate estimates do not confirm hypothesis ii.a): the share of
the first (controlling) owner is higher when the company is controlled by
another company, than when it is controlled by a physical person.
The technological intensity of production has the expected sign, but is
not statistically significant; this is probably due to measurement problems.
The size of the company and the size of the group are not statistically sig-
nificant.
We can conclude that hypothesis ii.a) is rejected by the data, while hy-
pothesis ii.b) is confirmed.
11 Also in this case we consider possible endogeneity problems. We use an instrumental
variable approach (2SLS). As instruments we use the average of the original variables
(Firm size, R&D intensity) at 2-digit Ateco. The Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests do not re-
ject the null hypothesis that the variable(s) under consideration are exogenous. Therefore
we use OLS estimation which is more efficient.
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5 Conclusions
Until recently the formation and presence of business groups was as-
sociated with large businesses, and explained predominantly by financial
theories. The presence of business groups in the small business sector sug-
gests that there are alternative theories, based on the entrepreneurial and
organizational strategies of entrepreneurs. Are both perspectives relevant
to understanding business group formation in the small firms sector, or are
the two explanations mutually exclusive in their respective contexts? This
paper sheds light on this issue by comparing both financial and entrepre-
neurial/organizational perspectives which may explain the formation and
characteristics of business groups in the small business sector.
These two perspectives have different implications for the role played
by minority shareholders in controlled firms. The financial explanation
highlights the importance of raising outside equity to separate cash flow
rights from control rights and maximize the return on the capital invested
by the entrepreneur. The entrepreneurial/organizational explanation con-
siders the raising of outside equity as a mechanism to incentivize new hu-
man resources, thus strengthening the entrepreneurial team involved in the
start-up and management of the new businesses. In so doing the establish-
ment of a new firm and its addition to the business group provides a more
efficient mechanism for organising and managing entrepreneurial diver-
sification which would otherwise could been incorporated less efficiently
within an existing firm (Wiklund and Shepherd, 2008).
Two hypotheses were derived from these contrasting perspectives for
detailed empirical analysis. The first hypothesis, i.e. that firms controlled
through business groups are expected to be larger and more capital inten-
sive (FP) is supported by the empirical evidence, but the counterpart hy-
pothesis (OP), i.e. that firms in business groups are more likely to be knowl-
edge intensive (in terms of human resources employed by the firm) is also
supported by the empirical evidence. In this sense both explanations seem
to be complementary to each other.
The greater presence of business groups in capital intensive sectors re-
sults from entrepreneurs using the cash flow accumulated by the estab-
lished firm to leverage equity. According to the FP this is often done at the
expense of minority shareholders. The ‘expropriation’ of minority share-
holders crucially depends on the degree of separation between cash flow
rights and control rights (i.e. the ownership shares of minority sharehold-
ers). According to this mechanism we expect that the ownership share in
indirectly controlled companies is lower than the ownership share of the
entrepreneurs in the directly controlled companies. The empirical evidence,
however, shows the contrary, that the entrepreneur’s share is lower in di-
rectly controlled firms than in those indirectly controlled. This finding is
compatible with the OP but less reconcilable with the FP. Furthermore given
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that in many cases ownership concentration is so high, this is less reconcil-
able with the aim of separating cash-flow rights from control rights.
For these reasons our empirical results confirm that the entrepreneurial
explanation provides a strong alternative explanation for the presence and
characteristics of business groups in the small business sector.
Our ability to research these issues quantitatively has been made pos-
sible by being able to access the Capitalia database in Italy which is rare
amongst data bases of firms in providing information on ownership links
across firms, and the ability to differentiate between vertical and horizon-
tal business groups. For this reason Italian firms have provided an impor-
tant context to explore these hypotheses. This study thus confirms the im-
portance of being able to establish data bases of firms capable of identify-
ing ownership linkages between portfolio entrepreneurs and the firms they
have an ownership stake in (Scott and Rosa, 1996). How far we may be able
to generalise further from these findings will depend to a large extent on the
ability of future studies to identify and explore similar data bases.
The empirical analysis has some limitations. The most important refers
to the variables available. In order to achieve a more precise investigation
of our hypotheses (in terms of ownership shares and sector of activity) we
should consider new-born firms in business groups, i.e. firms just after their
foundation, and the involvement of minority shareholders in the manage-
ment of the new-born firms. This would require ad hoc collection of data.
Despite this limitation, the original contribution of this paper is to show the
relevance of the ‘entrepreneurial/organizational perspective’, and to high-
light among other things, the role of human capital in explaining the pres-
ence of business groups. This is a crucial dimension that is mostly missing
from the ‘financial’ explanatory approach. Future research should focus on
related theoretical and empirical issues.
In terms of theoretical investigation, it might be fruitful to integrate mod-
els considering the role of human capital in the creation of new ventures in
the context of business groups. In relation to the empirical evidence, the
present study ‘indirectly’ tests the compatibility of the organiz ational ap-
proach with the available data, on the basis of some implications derived
from this approach. Empirical analysis would benefit from the development
of a more formal model to derive testable hypotheses. Also, analysis of the
involvement of minority shareholders in the management of new compa-
nies would be useful in order to assess the relevance of the organizational
approach.
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Appendix A Examples of Italian business groups
In the large firm sector business groups are conglomerate structures op-
erating in several sectors. A typical example for Italy is the CIR group (con-
trolled by di De Benedetti family) operating in four sectors: energy, me-
dia, automotive and healthcare. The prevailing organization of such groups
presents a holding company at the vertex of the group and several sub-
holdings controlling the companies in specific sectors (see Figure A1). In
2012 the CIR group had about 14,000 employees and generated a turnover
of about 5 billion euros through the control of more than one hundred com-
panies in Italy and abroad.
Figure A1 - The CIR Group
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Small and medium sized groups are more often operating in the same
sectoror in related sectors. Companies are created to exploit specific market
segments or to integrated activities along the production chain. An example
of medium sized groups is the Elica group (see Figure A2). The head of the
group, listed at Milan stock exchange, is an operating company producing
cooker hoods. All the companies within the group produce cooker hoods
or provide services and components to the affiliated companies. In 2012
the group had a consolidated turnover of 385 million Euros and about 3,000
employees.
In small groups companies are sometimes directly owned by the en-
trepreneur and other shareholders; however the prevailing structure is the
vertical structure (pyramid) in which a company owns shares in one or a
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few companies.
Examples of such groups are the Somacis group and the Lube group; the
first operating in the production of printed circuit boards and touch screen
devices; the second in the production of kitchen furniture.
The Somacis group is composed of height companies, four of which op-
erating abroad (see Figure A3). The head of the group is a holding company.
Of the three companies controlled by the head, two produce printed circuit
boards and one (Tastitalia) touch screen devices. In 2012 the Somacis group
had a consolidate turnover of 60.7 million Euros.
The Lube group is composed of six companies (see Figure A4). The head
of the group is a holding company. The controlled companies operate in the
production of different types of kitchen furniture or provide services for the
same production. In 2012 the Lube group had a consolidated turnover or
147.5 million euros.
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Figure A2 - The Elica Group
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Figure A3 - The Somacis Group
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Figure A4 - The Lube Group
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